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Abstract 
This paper presents preliminary summary results from a longitudinal study of 
participants in seven U.S. states during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition 
to standard socio-economic characteristics, we collect data on various 
economic preference parameters: time, risk, and social preferences, and risk 
perception biases. We pay special attention to predictors that are both 
important drivers of social distancing and are potentially malleable and 
susceptible to policy levers. We note three important findings: (1) 
demographic characteristics exert the largest influence on social distancing 
measures and mask-wearing, (2) we show that individual risk perception and 
cognitive biases exert a critical role in influencing the decision to adopt social 
distancing measures, (3) we identify important demographic groups that are 
most susceptible to changing their social distancing behaviors. These findings 
can help inform the design of policy interventions regarding targeting specific 
demographic groups, which can help reduce the transmission speed of the 
COVID-19 virus. (JEL I11, I12, I18, D81, D91, D62, D64) 
 
Keywords: COVID-19, social distancing, masks, mask-wearing, health 
markets, health economics, cognitive biases, exponential growth, behavioral 
economics 
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I. Introduction 
Absent a vaccine or antiretroviral drugs to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the 
only immediately available and possibly effective tools to decrease transmission are 
preventive measures, via individual behaviors. Government guidelines quickly pointed to two 
specific measures: social distancing and mask-wearing.1,2 In this paper, we examine what 
factors predict the tendency to adopt social distancing measures. Although many Americans 
have adopted these measures, many have not opted to do so (Saad, 2020). For social 
distancing to be effective against the spread of the disease, its adoption must be widespread 
and consistent.  
What are the most important drivers for social distancing? Are any of them subject to 
policy changes? We use longitudinal data, based on an online field experiment from seven 
U.S. states collected between May and July 2020, to address these questions. We recruited 
participants via online platforms who completed weekly surveys. Participants completed five 
surveys (two in the first week: an initial baseline and a follow-up survey, and surveys for each 
consecutive week for three weeks). The weekly surveys collected data on social distancing 
behaviors, general health, social preferences, time preferences, risk attitudes, cognitive 
assessment, attitudes towards COVID-19, perception biases, and personality traits. Based on 
four individual-level proxies of social distancing –days outside of one’s home in the past 
week, whether one left one’s home, whether one maintained at least six feet of distance, and 
the number non-essential reasons for leaving one’s home – we create a comprehensive social 
distancing index. Using the survey data, we take a reduced-form approach as we attempt to 
shed light on the relationship between the above factors and the demand for social distancing 
and mask-wearing.  
The classical economic model of individual demand for health, based on Grossman 
(1972), posits that individuals view health and preventive health measures as investments. 
 
1 On March 16th, 2020, President Donald Trump issued the first White House Coronavirus guidelines in which it was officially 
recommended that citizens avoid gatherings in groups of more than ten people at a national level (White House, 2020). 
2 Social distancing describes the practice of keeping a safe distance of at least six feet between yourself and those not from 
your household (CDCb, 2020). This guideline aims to reduce the potential for physical transmission of the virus from the 
infected to the non-infected. This practice is recommended in conjunction with the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
(face masks, gloves, etc.). PPE aims to limit respiratory transmission of the disease through breathing, coughing, and talking. 
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Consumers adopt better health behaviors by comparing the benefits and costs associated with 
these behaviors. This framework places the role of individual incentives front and center:  
viewing health in an inter-temporal framework, individuals make health investment decisions 
(e.g., exercise, nutrition) in the present to maximize their lifetime well-being. Changes to 
individual behavior in the present are associated with disutility (e.g., most changes to habits 
and behavior require some or a considerable degree of effort), and the adoption of new health 
behaviors requires a considerable amount of time investment or additional monetary costs.3 
Social distancing and mask-wearing are no different. Understanding how individuals make 
decisions regarding social distancing is further complicated by the fact that COVID-19 is an 
infectious disease and that preventive measures affect not only individual health, but also the 
health of others. In other words, individual decisions regarding optimal preventive measures 
could be socially suboptimal if people only care about their own health and not about how 
their behaviors affect the spread of disease to others, a classic case of a negative externality. 
Using data on various economic preference parameters, such as willingness to take on 
gambles, willingness to delay gratification, pro-social attitudes, and personality traits, we shed 
light on the determinants of individual decisions to adopt social distancing or mask-wearing. 
We pay special attention to factors that either exert a considerable influence on social 
distancing or are potentially malleable and susceptible to policy levers. 
In addition to individual economic preferences, we focus on the impact of two 
perception-related variables. The perceptual biases that we examine, risk misperception, and 
exponential growth bias (EGB), can affect decision-making and individual behaviors.4 By risk 
misperception, we refer to the difference between the subjective assessment of a disease risk 
versus the objective disease severity risk. In the context of COVID-19 risks, we specifically 
focus on the role of the mortality risk (or the so-called case fatality rate). We also examine the 
effect of EGB, the psychological phenomenon in which individuals tend to linearize 
exponential growth. This tendency leads to underestimating the future growth of a particular 
 
3 Strulik and Trimborn (2018) find that individuals continuously revise their life behaviors in order to increase health investment 
as they are driven by the desire for a long life, they note that these revisions are failed to be adhered to due to changing external 
biases. 
4 Conceptually, at least two behavioral biases predict that people may not engage in optimal levels in preventive health 
measures, such as social distancing: present bias (PB) and exponential growth bias (EGB). Present bias (PB) is the tendency to 
underweight future utility relative to present utility in a dynamically inconsistent way (Strotz 1955; Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue 
and Rabin 1999).4 Previous studies document that in intertemporal models, present bias can lead to lower demand for health 
relative to an unbiased person who shares the same long-run discount factor (Dupas 2011, Laibson 1997, Angeletos et al. 2001). 
A person with present-biased preferences may intend to invest more in health in the future but never do so (Dupas 2011).  
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variable, which leads to suboptimal decisions. In the context of COVID-19, exhibiting EGB 
simply means that people underestimate the speed at which the epidemic spreads. Although 
the implications of EGB for individuals making health decisions are immense, previous 
studies have exclusively focused on the welfare consequences of the phenomenon in the 
context of savings and debt (Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975; Wagenaar and Timmers 1979; 
Keren 1983; Benzion, Granot and Yagil 1992; Eisenstein and Hoch 2007; Alemberg and 
Gerdes 2012). In this paper, we examine whether people exhibit exponential growth bias in 
the health domain and whether its presence relates to lower willingness to adopt social 
distancing measures.5  
Understanding the mechanisms behind what drives suboptimal health decisions and 
social distancing, in particular, can inform the design of better policies. Although many 
factors may affect social distancing, we explore the possibility that for at least some people, 
the low adoption may be the result of low demand due to low perceived risks associated with 
COVID-19. If perceptual biases are the main reason behind the low adoption of social 
distancing, reducing such biases could lead to better health behaviors and higher social 
welfare. It is especially important to understand the role policies can play in mitigating such 
potential biases. Identifying which biases influence the decision to social distance can help 
inform the design of better policy interventions, from a welfare standpoint. 
Our analyses yield several interesting results. First, and controlling for other factors, 
political affiliation is a strong predictor of individual views on how various governmental 
levels handled the response to the epidemic. Democrats and Independents are more likely to 
view Federal, State, and Local government responses as not sufficiently aggressive compared 
to the views on the same topic by Republicans. This finding is consistent with recent survey 
evidence from smartphone data (Allcott et al., 2020), documenting that areas with more 
Republicans engaged in less social distancing. From a theoretical standpoint, the fact that 
political affiliation, in contrast to economic preference parameters, is a strong driver of the 
 
5 Levy and Tasoff (2016) show in the context of savings behaviors that EGB can lead to under-saving for retirement under 
certain conditions. A large body of evidence suggests that this bias is widespread and robust (Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975; 
Wagenaar and Timmers 1979; Keren 1983; Benzion, Granot and Yagil 1992; Eisenstein and Hoch 2007; Almenberg and Gerdes 
2012). 
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decision to social distance could demonstrate the usefulness of economic models related to the 
formation of social norms in the context of health behaviors.6  
Second, of all the variables included in our analyses, demographic characteristics are 
the greatest drivers of social distancing measures. Information on demographic factors that 
predict social distancing and mask-wearing can inform targeting of potential policies. 
Specifically, being Caucasian, a Republican affiliation, and higher household income are 
associated with lower adoption of social distancing measures. Living in a densely populated 
area, being currently married, and being highly concerned about own health are positively 
associated with higher rates of social distancing. Demographic characteristics also influence 
mask-wearing. Higher age and being female are both associated with more mask-wearing. In 
contrast, being Caucasian is associated with lower rates of mask-wearing. Among the 
economic preference factors, we find that exhibiting higher risk aversion is a strong predictor 
of social distancing and mask-wearing. We find no evidence of time preference per se 
influencing social distancing measures. However, we find a surprising relationship between 
time preferences and mask-wearing: individuals who exhibit higher patience (higher 
willingness to delay gratification) are less likely to wear a mask. 
Third, in addition to demographic and economic factors, we specifically examine the 
roles that perception and cognitive biases play in influencing the decision to adopt social 
distancing measures. We estimate the prevalence of the exponential growth bias in our 
sample. Numerous studies have addressed the theoretical relationship between standard time 
preferences and health behaviors (Grossman, 2017). However, surprisingly few attempts 
focus on the empirical relationship between EGB and health behaviors. Based on our sample, 
we establish an empirical link between the tendency to exhibit exponential growth bias and 
social distancing. We control for income, education, risk preference, time preference, a 
measure of cognitive skills, and a host of other characteristics, and find that that EGB is a 
statistically significant predictor of social distancing. On the aggregate social distancing 
index, people who misunderstand exponential growth (i.e., exhibit higher exponential growth 
 
6 Social norms provide informal rules that govern our actions within groups across various situations. A key feature of a social 
norm is the desire to conform to the majority in a group, as noted by Bicchieri (2017, p. 35). Brock and Durlauf (2001) model 
the development of norms within a group; building on the model of Brock and Durlauf (2001), Smerdon et al. (2020) design 
an experiment in which they investigate the role that information about others’ preferences on the development of “bad” norms. 
They find that the strength of social interactions is a critical factor for a bad norm to persist. 
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bias) report a lower tendency to social distance. We also find suggestive evidence that 
individuals who misperceive the risk associated with COVID-19 are less likely to wear a 
mask. 
We note several important limitations of our analyses. The findings reported in our 
study rely on econometric specifications that should be interpreted with some caution from a 
causal standpoint. Although we find important predictors of social distancing behaviors, the 
variation in these predictors is not driven by an exogenous source of variation. However, 
many of the predictors are either demographic characteristics or economic preference 
characteristics that recent empirical studies have documented to exhibit stability over time: for 
risk preferences (Dohmen, Lehmann, and Pignatti, 2016; Chuang and Schechter, 2015; 
Nikolov, 2018), time preferences (Meier and Sprenger, 2015), personality traits (Roberts, 
2009), or social preferences (Carlsson et al., 2014). Furthermore, establishing a causal 
relationship between economic preference parameters and social distancing measures would 
be a challenging task because behavioral parameters cannot be exogenously varied. Finally, 
our analysis relies on a small sample from seven states that exhibits important differences 
compared to the general population. Therefore, there may be difficulty extrapolating our 
findings to the general populations or other settings.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the survey data and 
specific survey measures. Section III presents analyses on the most important predictors of 
adherence to social distancing and mask-wearing. Section IV discusses key takeaways from 
the analysis and provides some concluding remarks.  
II. Design and Survey Data 
A. Study Design and Survey Data 
To examine the determinants of social distancing behavior, we conducted a 
longitudinal survey as part of an ongoing online field experiment (results from which we do 
not report here). The field experiment aimed to examine how random assignment to 
informational treatment influenced economic preference parameters and subsequent tendency 
to adopt social distancing and mask-wearing behaviors. Requirements to participate in the 
experimental study were: 1) being 18 years of age or over, and 2) current residence in one of 
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seven states7: Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New 
York, and 3) consent to be contacted by the study team for follow-up purposes.8  
Recruitment and data collection for the study was executed remotely. Starting in May 
2020, participants were invited to participate in the study through recruitment ads posted on 
the Binghamton University Experimental Economics Lab, online postings, and word of 
mouth. Upon invitation to participate in the study, individuals filled out a brief online 
screening form to ensure they met the study’s eligibility criteria. Once enrolled, participants 
were invited to complete weekly surveys for seven weeks. The surveys collected information 
regarding social distancing behaviors, general health, social, time, and risk preferences, and 
exponential growth knowledge at that particular period in time.9 Participants completed five 
surveys (two in the first week: an initial baseline and a follow-up survey, and three weekly 
surveys for three consecutive weeks). The follow-up surveys covered questions, also elicited 
during the baseline, to enable an analysis of changes in behaviors over the study period. 
The baseline study instrument comprises the following modules: (a) socio-
demographic information, (b) mask-wearing and social distancing, (c) exponential growth 
assessment, (d) social, time, and risk preferences, (e) health outcomes, (f) cognitive 
assessment, and (g) attitudes. We detail the definition of the critical variables in Section II.C. 
We first report, in Table 1, the average characteristics of the study participants. Our 
overall sample is 42.40 years of age. The study sample is majority female, a split of 713 
females and 188 males. The male sample reports a lower average age as compared to the 
female sample, with a reported average age of 32.99 and 44.88 years, respectively. The 
sample is primarily of Caucasian ethnicity, with an annual household income of 
approximately $116,000. In terms of educational attainment, over half of the participants (61 
percent) report receiving a degree from a four-year college program. Approximately a tenth 
(nine percent) of the sample is obtaining an educational degree. In terms of employment, 48 
percent of the sample reports being currently employed. It is worth noting that in terms of risk 
 
7 These states collected daily data updates on the number of cases and number of deaths related to COVID-19 within state 
borders at the county level. 
8 Weekly follow-up phone interviews were conducted with respondents where the research team discovered inconsistency in 
responses.   
9 Data collection was executed on the oTree platform, designed by Chen et al. (2016). Participants received incentive payments 
related to the incentive-based measurements of specific survey tasks (e.g., risk preferences and exponential growth bias 
measurements). 
7 
 
and time preferences, our sample was on average risk-neutral and consisted of individuals 
who are more likely to be patient than impatient regarding financial decisions.10  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 reports the summary characteristics by the state of residence. The majority of 
the sample resides in New York State. The average participant that resides in New York is 
significantly younger and more likely to be a full-time student than those in the other six 
states. Although the majority of the sample is Caucasian, it is interesting to point out that the 
subsample residing in New York is the most ethnically diverse, with 4 percent of participants 
reporting to be African American. In contrast, Florida and Pennsylvania are the least diverse 
states in the sample, with no reported African Americans. We also report political affiliation 
by the state of residence: Florida (0.18) and Pennsylvania (0.18) tend to have the most 
Republican-voting participants in our sample. In contrast, participants in the following states 
of residence are more likely to report Democratic affiliation: Connecticut (.69), Massachusetts 
(.67), Maryland (.67), and New Jersey (.68).  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
B. Social Distancing and Mask Wearing Behaviors 
Since the primary objective of the study is understanding the determinants of social 
distancing and mask-wearing behaviors, we collect the various proxies of social distancing 
collected.  
 
Proxies of Social Distancing. We collect data on social distancing and mask-wearing 
behaviors. We rely on four different proxy measures of social distancing: (1) a quantitative 
measure of the days outside of one’s home in the past week, (2) whether one left one’s home, 
(3) whether one maintained at least six feet of distance, and (4) a quantitative measure of non-
essential reasons for leaving one’s home. We measure the number of days one indicated 
 
10 The risk aversion index, based on the switching point, is measured from 1 to 10 (1 indicates a very risk averse respondent; 
10 a very risk-tolerant respondent). 
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having been outside of one’s home based on the following question: “during the past seven 
days, how many days did you leave home?” We quantify this variable using a 7-point scale; 7 
indicates that a person left the house every day in the past seven days. We measure whether 
one left one’s home the day prior to taking the survey with a binary indicator, set to 1 if the 
person indicated they left the house.11 We measure whether one maintained two meters (or six 
feet) from other people also based on a binary variable, set to 1 if the person did not maintain 
at least six feet from other people. Our final proxy measures the number of non-essential 
outings outside of the house. 
Based on these four variables, we created an aggregated social distancing index which 
was generated based on a principle component procedure. The social distancing index is 
continuous and negatively coded (i.e., an increase in the index denotes less social distancing). 
Although we report information on how factors correlate with the primary index, we also 
report analyses based on the distinct proxy indicators of social distancing discussed above. 
We report, in Table 3, how these proxies of social distancing (measured at the 
baseline12) vary by socio-economic characteristics.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
We detect some differences by race for two specific proxies of social distancing. 
African Americans report a higher number of non-essential outings per week than Caucasians, 
although Caucasians leave the house significantly more days per week than African 
Americans, 3.22 and 0.21 days, respectively. Despite the difference in the specific measures, 
the overall social distancing index is very similar for both ethnicities at 0.07 for Caucasians 
and 0.08 for African Americans.  
 
11 For the variable “did not stay home,” we used the following survey question: “In the past week, I stayed at home”. Survey 
respondents responded on a scale from 0 to 100 (in increments of 10) with 0 indicating “does not apply at all” and 100 indicating 
“applies very much,” with values of 100 indicating complete adherence (=1 for the binary indicator) on this proxy measure. 
For the variable “did not maintain six feet,” we used the following question: “In the past week, I kept a distance of at least two 
meters (six feet) to other people.” Values of 100 (out of a scale from 0 to 100) indicated completed adherence to the six-feet 
rule and were set to 1 for the binary indicator for this proxy measure. The number of non-essential outings was based on survey 
responses for the following question: “What are reasons for you to leave your home (select all that apply)?” Respondents could 
select among 13 choices regarding reasons to leave the home spanning from going to work and exercising to getting bored and 
exercising their freedom. We classified the following responses as “non-essential” reasons: getting tired of being inside the 
home, getting bored, getting adrenaline (from breaking the law), and exercising my freedom. The continuous measure can take 
on values up to 4. 
12 The baseline survey was collected prior to the Black Lives Matter protests, which started the last week of May 2020. 
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Proxies of Mask-Wearing. We also collected information on mask-wearing. We 
measure mask-wearing behaviors with two binary indicators. The first indicator measures 
whether a person wears a mask (or personal protective equipment) at all times outside of the 
home or not. The second indicator measures whether a person reported wearing a mask or 
personal protective equipment (PPE) when conducting daily business, shopping, or running 
errands.13 Although the two indicators are related, the second indicator captures behaviors 
when a person wears a mask only when conducting essential activities and not necessarily 
wearing it at all times.  
Table 4 reports descriptive analysis on mask-wearing behaviors by demographic 
characteristics: Caucasians tend to wear masks more frequently than African Americans in 
our sample when accounting for both daily use and use when shopping. However, over the 
two weeks (between the baseline and the second follow-up wave), African Americans 
indicated a considerably higher increase in mask usage than the change in mask-wearing 
behaviors among Caucasians.14  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 show that Republicans in our sample tend to 
adopt social distancing significantly less than Democrats or Independents. Individuals who 
self-identify as Republican, and relative to individuals who self-identify with other political 
parties, report lower mask-wearing (both on the daily measure and when shopping). These 
results are consistent with a recent report based on observational data from Allcott et al. 
(2020). Average social distancing (based on the comprehensive index) increases with 
education level. Individuals with a high school diploma only social distance less, whereas 
individuals with a graduate school degree report social distancing at higher rates. Notably, this 
 
13 The two mask-wearing binary indicators were based on two survey questions. The first question was based on a survey 
question “When I leave my home, I use personal protective equipment.” Individuals indicating complete adherence (responses 
=100) were coded as wearing a mask. The second question was based on the following question “Under which circumstances 
do you use any personal protective equipment (PPE) (such as face mask and gloves)?” When the respondent selected the option 
“Daily business for example shopping, mailing, pharmacy”, the indicator for mask-wearing when shopping was set to 1, and 0 
otherwise. Data for this indicator was only available during the baseline week as participants were not asked the same question 
in the follow-up surveys. As a result, we are unable to subsequent behavior changes for this question only. 
14 Our sample based on changes in the variables is smaller due to attrition of subjects. 
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pattern among education groups does not align with the adoption of mask-wearing; graduate 
degree holders tend to wear masks the least.15 We return to the issue of other correlates of 
social distancing and mask-wearing, once we account for other individual-level factors, such 
as individual economic preferences.  
C. Survey Data of Economic Preferences  
We also collect rich information on an array of economic preferences variables, such as 
risk preferences, time preferences, social preferences, hyperbolic time-inconsistent behavior, 
and the tendency to exhibit exponential growth bias.  
 
     Time Preferences. Given the conceptual link between economic models on health 
investments and time preferences, we elicit respondents’ time preferences. As is common in the 
related literature, we measure time preferences by asking participants to choose either a smaller 
amount of monetary compensation sooner or a larger amount in the future (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986; Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley 1993, Ashraf et al., 2006).16  
We use two distinct staircase procedures.17 The procedure presented the same 
questions for two assessments, with one presented in the near frame and one in the distant 
temporal frame. For the near-frame question, we elicit the respondent’s willingness to choose 
the smaller reward immediately versus receiving a larger reward in 12 months. Participants 
were asked to choose either $160 today or $246 in twelve months. If they chose the smaller 
amount today, the next question would offer them the same amount today ($160), but an 
amount higher than $246 in 12 months. If they chose $246 in 12 months, the next question 
offers them the same amount today ($160), and an amount smaller than $246 in 12 months. 
The participant responds to a maximum of five questions, and each time their future payoff is 
adjusted based on earlier responses. The respondent is then asked the same initial question 
regarding a future time frame (12 months versus 24 months but with the same monetary 
rewards) to identify time-preference reversals. Based on the multiple time-preference 
questions, we created a continuous index from 0 to 32, with increasing numbers indicating 
 
15 A recent Gallup poll contradicts this pattern and finds that college graduates tend to wear masks more compared to individuals 
without a college degree (Brenan, 2020). 
16 Anderson et al. (2002) and Frederik et al. (2002) review elicitation methods for time preferences.  
17 The procedures used was based on Falk et al. (2016) and Holzmeister (2017). The staircase procedure streamlines the 
elicitation process by requiring considerably fewer questions, in contrast to MPL elicitations.  
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higher patience (32 on the index denoted extreme tendency to delay gratification and 
preference for the delayed reward). If an individual chooses to take a smaller amount of 
money today for the first question, we define them as impatient in the near frame (with the 
same process repeated in the distant frame). To do so, we use binary indicators based on near-
frame questions. Specifically, we denote individuals as “very patient” (set to 1) if they have a 
score of 32 on the preference index. We use a binary indicator to denote individuals as “very 
impatient” (the binary indicator is set to 1) if the individual has a score of 1 on the preference 
index).  
Based on the time-preference indices of the near and distant frames, we can also 
observe time-inconsistent choices. We define a participant to be “hyperbolic time-
inconsistent” based on the choice of the immediate reward in the near-term frame combined 
with the choice of the delayed reward in the distant frame since the implied discount rate in 
the near-term frame is higher than that of the distant frame. We also identify inconsistencies 
in the other direction, where individuals are patient now but in 12 months are not willing to 
wait; we refer to these as individuals as “patient now and impatient later.”18 
 
 Risk Preferences. We elicit risk tolerance based on an incentivized risk elicitation 
task, the multiple price list (MPL), based on Holt and Laury (2002)19. In such activity, 
participants are prompted with two options, Option A and Option B, with Option B being 
“riskier.”20 The individual chooses which option they prefer. When the probability associated 
with the high payoffs increases sufficiently (as the individual moves down the table), a risk-
averse person should cross over to Option B. We use this switching point to Option B to 
quantify one’s risk tolerance—participants with a higher risk-tolerance switch at lower 
 
18 Individuals are defined as time-inconsistent if their switching row value is lower in the near frame than in the far frame 
(indicating they are more patient in the near frame than in the far frame). 
19 Charness et al. (2013) reviews limitations of non-incentivized tasks for risk-preference elicitations.  
20 In the MPL, participants are presented with two lists of options: Option A and Option B. Each option represents a gamble: 
Option A offers 1/10 a chance of winning $2 and 9/10 chance of winning $1.60 while Option B offers 1/10 chance of winning 
$3.85 and 9/10 chance of winning $0.10. The participants marked which of the two options they would prefer, with Option B 
indicating an individual with a higher tolerance for risk. The questions continue with the chances of winning the higher dollar 
value in both rising until a 100% chance is offered for winning both $2 and $3.85 in Option A and B respectively. The question 
at which the player switches from Option A to Option B is denoted as their switching row. 
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switching row values. In contrast, more risk-averse participants tend to switch at higher 
switching row values.21 
 
 Objective COVID-19 Mortality Risk and Perceived Mortality Risks. We elicited 
subjective assessments of mortality risks associated with COVID-19. Quantifying perceptions 
of risk related to COVID-19 is difficult, especially with young respondents. Valuable 
summaries of methods for eliciting expectations for a range of outcomes can be found in 
Manski (2004) and Delavande, Gine, and McKenzie (2008). Therefore, in this survey, we 
only elicited risk perceptions based on simple questions about the perceived risk of mortality 
related to COVID-19. Individuals were prompted to provide a subjective assessment 
regarding the fatality rate of COVID-19. Specifically, each respondent reported a subjective 
estimate for a hypothetical set of 1000 individuals in their county of residence who are 
infected with COVID-19. We use this proxy measure to serve as a subjective assessment of 
the so-called case fatality rate (CFR), measuring the severity of a disease. The CFR is the 
proportion of people who die from a specified disease among all individuals diagnosed with 
the disease over a certain period.  
These simple questions eliciting the subjective assessment of the CFR rate have 
several evident and significant limitations. They are not precise in specifying the meaning of 
“expected.” The measure does not elicit uncertainty. The questions also deal with an abstract 
and hypothetical situation. 
Based on data obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
we also collect data on the objective risk, capturing the weekly CFR rate at the county level. 
This data is merged with our longitudinal panel survey based on the county of residence of 
each respondent. 
We also calculate the difference between the subjective perception and the objective 
risk, a measure which we call subjective misperception (positive values indicate over-
perception of the CFR rate; negative values indicate under-perception of the CFR rate). In 
summary, the misperception measure indicates whether personal subjective assessment about 
the mortality risk considerably deviates from the objective risk data related to COVID-19.  
 
21 The elicitation method is complex for some participants as noted in Dave et al. (2010) and Holt and Laury (2002). Therefore, 
some participants switched more than once between the two options. We address this issue following the approach in Engel 
and Kirchkamp (2016).  
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 Social Preferences. We also collect data on two proxies of social preferences: positive 
reciprocity and altruism.22 Positive reciprocity is the tendency for an individual who receives 
a positive benefit from an action to reciprocate with an action that has at least an equal 
amount of complimentary benefit (Suranovic, 2001).23 We proxy positive reciprocity with two 
measures, a quantitative and a qualitative measure. The qualitative question asks individuals 
to self-reflect on how much the following statement applies to them: ‘When someone does me 
a favor, I am willing to return it.” The quantitative question poses a hypothetical scenario in 
which the participant is in an area they do not know and their phone is about to run out of 
battery. The participant is then prompted to indicate the monetary value of a gift they would 
be willing to gift to a hypothetical stranger who presented them with a charging cable worth 
$40.  
We also collect data on proxies of altruism, the concept of one’s capacity for 
unconditional kindness. Altruism does not reflect reciprocity in response to someone else’s 
altruism (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). We proxy altruism with a qualitative survey question; 
respondents were asked to self-reflect on how much the following statement applies to them: 
“How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?”24 
 
 Exponential Growth Bias. Exponential growth bias (EGB) is the tendency of people 
to exhibit a perceptual bias to underestimate exponential growth. The phenomenon refers to 
peoples’ tendency to linearize exponential growth. Individuals who exhibit EGB 
underestimate the future value of a variable growing at a constant rate. Previous economics 
studies explore the importance of this phenomenon for savings decisions and for 
underestimating exponential growth due to compound interest (i.e., a person who exhibits 
EGB underestimates the returns to savings and the costs of holding debt).25 Because people 
who exhibit EGB underestimate the speed at which the spread of the epidemic grows, we 
 
22 Social preferences were elicited based on the procedures adopted by Falk et al. (2016).  
23 We also measure negative reciprocity. Positive and negative reciprocity are weakly correlated (Dohmen et al., 2008).  
24 We collect information based on the following question: “Today you unexpectedly received 1,600 U.S.dollars. How much 
of this amount would you donate to a good cause?”  
25 Starting with Stango and Zinman (2009), several studies find evidence of exponential growth bias (EGB) in financial 
decisions based on laboratory or field experiments. Levy and Tasoff (2015) document that EGB can lead to under-saving for 
retirement. Other studies document the existence of this bias in numerous settings (Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975; Wagenaar and 
Timmers 1979; Keren 1983; Benzion, Granot and Yagil 1992; Eisenstein and Hoch 2007; Almenberg and Gerdes 2012). No 
empirical evidence exists on the existence of EGB in the context of disease spread. 
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collect data to proxy EGB so we can examine whether the magnitude of the EGB is related to 
the adoption of social distancing measures.  
To proxy the prevalence of exponential growth bias, we ask participants a series of 
five questions similar to the approach adopted by Stango and Zinman (2009) and Levy and 
Tasoff (2016). Questions covered growth phenomena in several domains: epidemic growth, 
population growth, and financial asset growth. In the elicitation method, participants are asked 
to calculate the final value given the initial value, growth rate, and period.26 For example, in 
the context of financial assets, we asked participants to calculate how much an investment of 
a certain amount would be worth after a specified period with a given interest. Similar 
questions are asked about the growth of a disease: information is provided about the initial 
number of people infected by an infectious disease and the number of new infections in a 
specified period (growth rate); participants are prompted to provide their assessment on the 
number of total infections within a given timeframe. Among the five questions, three 
questions referred to the growth of an amount in a bank account at a given interest rate, and 
two questions referred to the growth of a disease spread. Each response is marked as correct 
or not. Based on standardized measures from these five binary indicators, we generate a 
comprehensive index. We use the aggregated EGB index (higher and more positive values are 
associated with a higher tendency for EGB) to examine how it relates to the study outcomes.  
 Assessment of Cognitive Skills and Personality Traits. We use an abbreviated version 
of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. The Raven test, which consists of non-verbal multiple 
choice questions, is recognized as a leading measure of analytic intelligence (Carpenter et al., 
1990; Gray and Thompson, 2004). Each question asks the subjects to identify the missing 
element that completes a visual pattern. The test was not incentivized, a method consistent 
with the approach adopted in recent psychology studies (Gill and Prowse, 2014).27  
We also collected data on the “Big Five” personality traits: openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (John and Srivastava, 
1999).28 Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) show that personality traits can influence economic 
decisions.  
 
26 Subjects were not prohibited from using calculators or online tools to help them answer the questions. 
27 The Raven’s cognitive assessment consisted of four tasks with time allocation 120 seconds. Based on the number of correct 
answers and the time finished, we generated a variable for the number of correct responses per time taken to complete the task.   
28 Openness measures creativity and imagination, conscientiousness measures care and self-discipline, extraversion measures 
sociability and energy, agreeableness measures tendency to adhere to social harmony, and neuroticism measures negativity and 
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III. Factors Predicting Social Distancing Behaviors 
 
In this Section, we examine the participants’ views on the government’s responses by political 
affiliation. For these analyses, we use data from the baseline. We also use the panel feature of 
the survey design to examine changes in individual behaviors.  Specifically, we analyze 
predictors of the social distancing measures, with a particular focus on the economic 
preferences and the perception-related variables to predict the decision to adopt social 
distancing measures.  
A. Views on Government Response by Political Affiliation 
We analyze the respondents’ views, by political affiliation, of the government’s 
response to COVID-19. Respondents provided their assessment on the reaction of various 
levels of the government based on the following question: “Do you think the reaction of the 
Federal/State/Local government to the current coronavirus outbreak is appropriate, too 
extreme, or not sufficient?” We measure the reaction to the government’s response to 
COVID-19, on a scale of one to five, with 1 being “much too extreme” and five being “not 
sufficient at all.” Based on the scale used for this question, a response of 3 indicated “the 
reaction is appropriate” for all questions.  
Table 5 reports the aggregated results. The most favorable views are associated with 
the State government’s response. In contrast, the least favorable views relate to how the 
Federal government handled the response to the epidemic.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Political affiliation is a strong predictor of individual views on how various 
governmental levels handled the response to the epidemic. Democrats and Independents are 
 
self-doubt (John and Srivastava, 1999). We elicited the traits based on a Likert-style scale using the following prompts: “I see 
myself as (trait).” Each trait is related to two survey questions, which then are standardized and used to generate a continuous 
index measurement for each trait. 
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more likely to view Federal, State, and Local government responses and the general public’s 
response, as not sufficiently aggressive compared to views on the same topic by Republicans. 
For example, the average Republican indicates a score of 3.15 relating to the Federal 
government response. In contrast, Democrats score 4.54, and Independents score 4.04. 
Republicans, compared to individuals who indicate affiliation with the other two groups, view 
the Federal government as acting appropriately.29  
 
B. Predictors of Social Distancing 
 
To document the associations between individual characteristics and health behaviors, we 
estimate the following regression:  
 
 =  +  +  + 	 
 
where  is a measure of individual i’s social distancing behavior,  is a vector of individual 
characteristics,  is a constant term,  is the county of residence fixed effects, and ε is the 
error term. We note changes to the set of individual characteristics included in the 
specifications as we present the results.30 
 
Demographic Factors. Table 6 reports the relationships between individual characteristics 
and various proxies of social distancing behaviors, based on the baseline data. Column (5) 
reports the results based on the aggregated social distancing index (higher values on the index 
indicate a lower tendency to social distance). We focus on the findings based on the aggregate 
social distancing index, as it comprises the four distinct proxies of social distancing (staying 
at home, non-essential outings, days outside the home in the past seven days, and the 
tendency to maintain at least six feet of distance from others). Columns (6)-(7) report the 
results on the two proxies for mask-wearing.  
 
 
29 These findings are consistent with polls conducted at the same time as our baseline by Pew Research, reporting that 77 
percent of Republicans respond favorably to Trump’s responses to the outbreak. In contrast, only 11 percent of Democrats 
approve of Trump’s responses (Pew Research Center, 2020). 
30 We estimate linear models for continuous variables. For dichotomous variables, we estimate linear probability models. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
 
The results indicate the critical role that individual demographic characteristics play in 
influencing social distancing. Of all the variables included in our analyses, demographic 
characteristics exert the most considerable influence on social distancing measures. Being 
Caucasian, being a Republican, and a higher household income are statistically significant 
predictors of and are negatively associated with social distancing. In contrast, being currently 
married is associated with higher rates of social distancing. In terms of effect sizes, it is 
noteworthy that ethnicity, political affiliation, and household income exert the most 
substantial influence on social distancing measures. For example, Caucasians are considerably 
less likely to socially distance themselves and wear masks than other ethnicities (significant at 
the one percent level). Republicans report lower rates of social distancing, a result significant 
at the five percent level, as compared to the group of individuals reporting non-Republican 
affiliation.  
Marital status and household income are significant correlates of social distancing. 
Being married is associated with a higher likelihood for individuals to both have fewer non-
essential outings (significant at the five percent level) and wearing a mask when shopping 
(significant at the five percent level). This pattern is likely related to lower demand for social 
contacts as married people already have more social contacts due to having a partner present 
within the home. Unmarried individuals may feel a greater inclination to leave home to get 
interaction not received inside the household. We find that those who have higher earnings are 
more likely to leave the house more frequently and participate in non-essential outings 
(significant at the five percent and one percent level, respectively).  
Demographic characteristics also influence mask-wearing. Age and being female exert 
a positive effect on the tendency to wear a mask. Being Caucasian is negatively associated 
with the tendency to wear a mask. When we compare the results in Columns (5) and (7), we 
note a pattern: groups (ethnicity, gender, marital status, and political affiliation) that report 
higher mask-wearing also report lower social distancing tendencies. 
We do not detect a consistent effect of educational attainment on social distancing or 
mask-wearing. The continuously defined education variable negatively affects mask-wearing. 
However, the binary indicator for a college education has a positive effect on mask-wearing 
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(imprecisely estimated) and a positive effect on mask-wearing when shopping (significant at 
the five percent level).31 We do not detect any statistically significant effect of the cognitive 
performance task on the social-distancing measures or mask-wearing.32  
 
Economic Preference Parameters. Among the economic preference factors, we find that risk 
aversion is a strong predictor of social distancing and mask-wearing. The findings in Column 
(5) of Table 6 show that more risk-averse people socially distance more. Specifically, more 
risk-averse people are also less likely to leave the house less and report more days outside the 
home (both are significant at the one percent level). This pattern is consistent with recent 
economic studies, which also document that higher risk aversion reduces the incidence of 
risky health behaviors, such as cigarette smoking, heavy drinking, obesity, and seat-belt use 
(Anderson and Miller, 2008; de Oliveira et al., 2016).  
We find no evidence of time preference influencing social distancing measures. 
However, we find a surprising relationship: people with lower willingness to delay 
gratification (i.e., higher impatience) exhibit a higher tendency to wear a mask, controlling for 
other factors. A similar pattern is documented by Scharff and Viscusi (2011) in the context of 
time discounting and smoking status. Scharff & Viscusi (2011) find that current smokers have 
a higher implied rate of time preference than nonsmokers. Chapman (2005) argues that the 
strength and the direction of the association between better health behaviors and time 
discounting depend critically on the specific preventive health behavior.33  
 We find strong evidence that personality traits are significant predictors of social 
distancing measures. The three most crucial traits for more social distancing are higher 
positive reciprocity, higher openness, and being more agreeable.34  
 
 
31 Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) find a large and persistent positive association between education and health. They find that 
the positive effect of education increases with increasing years of education, with no evidence of a sheepskin effect. 
32 Bijwaard et al. (2016) examine the importance of cognitive skills for health outcomes. The study finds that for most ages, 
cognitive ability explains around half of the raw differences in health outcomes (mortality) across educational groups. 
33 Based on a meta-analysis study, Chapman (2005) shows that ‘hot’ or addictive health behaviors such as smoking, are more 
likely to associated with time preference than ‘cold’ behaviors such as vaccination. Other prevention behaviors designed to 
prevent cervical and breast cancer are associated with individuals with higher life expectancy, lower time preference, and more 
risk aversion (Picone et al. 2004). 
34 Bogg & Roberts (2004) find that individuals who are conscientious engage in less risky health-behaviors. Other studies (Post, 
2005; Borgonovi, 2008) also find a positive correlation between higher altruism and better health outcomes. Bessey (2018) 
finds that agreeableness is negatively related to the probability of drinking and engaging in physical activity. Brummett et al., 
(2006) finds that personality traits are a significant predictor of BMI; the study finds that extraversion, neuroticism, and 
conscientiousness determine weight gain in adulthood.  
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The Role of Misperception. We examine the possibility that exponential growth bias (EGB) 
could influence social distancing behavior. Specifically, we regress the proxies of social 
distancing on the exponential growth bias index, controlling for all other socio-economic 
characteristics and economic preference factors. On the aggregate social distancing index, 
people who misunderstand exponential growth (i.e., exhibit higher exponential growth bias) 
report a lower tendency to social distance. Specifically, higher EGB strongly predicts the 
number of days one leaves the house per week. EGB influences the other proxies of social 
distancing (in Table 6), but the effect size estimates are imprecise. Given the importance of 
EGB in predicting social distancing outcomes, we return to examining what factors predict 
the presence of EGB itself. 
We collect detailed information on the CFR (as defined in Section II.C) associated 
with COVID-19 at the county level. Therefore, we can conduct additional analyses on 
people’s subjective assessments of the disease risk associated with this dimension of the 
disease. The average CFR for counties associated with the place of residence for people in our 
sample and at the time of the baseline (i.e., the last week of May 2020) is 0.06. This rate 
mirrors the average rate for the United States during the last week of May (European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020).  
Using data from the panel survey, we examine the accuracy of the respondents’ 
assessment regarding the CFR in their county of residence. Despite the limitations of the 
measures of the subjective assessment of the CFR, it is worth exploring whether they predict 
social distancing decisions. The average subjective assessment of the CFR, associated with 
the respondent’s county of residence in our sample, is 0.07 (slightly higher than the average 
objective county-level CFR for the counties of the individuals in our sample). In contrast, the 
median subjective assessment is 0.03. These numbers imply that a considerable number of 
respondents underestimate the risks associated with COVID-19 (67 percent of the sample 
reports a subjective assessment that is lower than the objective CFR in their county of 
residence) and that a small fraction overstates the risks by a lot.  
We examine how the accuracy of risk perception associated with COVID-19 predicts 
social distancing behavior. Table 6 reports the results. We do not detect statistically 
significant effects on the aggregate social distancing index, based on the percent definition of 
the risk misperception variable. Based on the same specifications, we also conduct additional 
20 
 
analyses based on binary definitions for subgroups with wildly inaccurate misperceptions 
(i.e., more than 10 percent difference from the objective CFR). Results, based on these 
subgroups, are suggestive of negative effects on the aggregate social distancing index, but 
they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Table 6 (Column 6) also reports the 
results for the mask-wearing outcome: the results show that individuals who misperceive the 
CFR risk associated with COVID-19 are considerably less likely to wear a mask.  
 
 
Predictors to Changes of Own Behavior. Because we rely on longitudinal data from the same 
people, we can also examine whether any variables predict changes to individual behavior. An 
important caveat to this analysis is that it relies on a limited time-period (three weeks) and 
fewer observations due to some panel attrition. On the other hand, examining longitudinal 
differences can be useful for policies that aim at influencing changes to behavior. Table 7 
reports the findings of this analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
 
We find that six factors are significant predictors of changes to one’s behavior regarding 
social distancing. Specifically, being currently married, being Caucasian, intense COVID-19 
fears35, living in a more densely populated county, higher cognitive performance, and being 
more agreeable36 (the Big Five index) are important drivers of changes in social distancing 
outcomes.  
    
C. Determinants of Risk Misperception and Exponential Growth Bias 
 
 
35 We constructed a COVID-19 fear indicator as a binary measure. The variable is based on the respondent indicating that 
he/she worries on daily to the following question: “How frequently have you feared being infected with COVID-19 in the past 
month?” 
36 This finding is consistent with a meta-analysis study, conducted by Kline et al. (2019), showing that agreeableness is a 
consistent and significant predictor of increased prosocial behavior.  
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As we noted earlier, the two perception variables, risk misperception and EGB, predict 
social distancing or mask-wearing. Therefore, we examine the drivers of the EGB and risk 
misperception. A better understanding of the predictors of these two phenomena will shed 
light on mechanisms that will help the design of policies geared towards reducing EGB and 
risk misperception. Tables 8 and 9 report the findings.  
The strongest predictors of individual misperceptions relate to gender, ethnicity, 
political affiliation, population density, and concerns about their health. We find that females 
are more likely to overstate the risk of COVID-19 (related to the CFR measure defined in 
Section II). Caucasians and people who reported Republican affiliation exhibit lower risk 
perception (significant at the one percent level). The same two demographic groups are not 
only the ones reporting lower subjective risk perception, but also the ones considerably 
understating the COVID-19 risk in areas where the COVID-19 risks (associated with the 
CFR) are objectively much higher than the subjective assessments.  
 
[Insert Table 8] [Insert Table 9] 
 
Exponential growth bias is best predicted by age, gender, schooling, cognitive skills, 
and neuroticism. In terms of the effect size estimates related to the predictors, gender, 
cognitive score, and schooling exert the largest effect on the EGB. Older individuals, being 
female, and the neuroticism trait positively predict EGB. In contrast, higher educational 
attainment, better cognitive performance, and higher earnings considerably reduce the 
magnitude of EGB.37 Although not reported here, a related online field experiment examines 
the role informational provision can play in influencing EGB and subsequent behaviors.  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 Understanding the determinants of what influences preventive measures against the 
COVID-19 virus is paramount for effective policies to be successful in encouraging people to 
adopt social distancing measures and mask-wearing. Absent a vaccine, the best we can do is 
structure policy aimed at those failing to adhere to preventive health measures to curb the 
 
37 It is noteworthy that the EGB measure is also highly correlated with higher risk aversion and higher patience (time preference 
index).  
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spread of COVID-19. However, if people do not have the incentives to do so on their own, the 
implementation of policies or mandates are unlikely to succeed. To this end, we note several 
important lessons from the preliminary analysis based on the panel data from participants in 
our study.  
 First, the key drivers of social distancing measures are demographic ones, even when 
we control for numerous other factors. Of all the variables included in our analyses, 
demographic characteristics exert the most considerable influence on social distancing 
measures. Being Caucasian, being a Republican, and higher household income are statistically 
significant predictors of lower rates of social distancing. In contrast, being currently married 
is positively associated with higher rates of social distancing.  
The importance of demographic variables for influencing social distancing is 
somewhat puzzling. They may account for critical, unobservable characteristics that are hard 
to measure. For example, the demographic characteristics may pick up mechanisms related to 
how well-informed individual decision-makers are, or how information about the virus, the 
risks associated with, or about the effectiveness of social distancing measures gets shared 
across social networks. On the other hand, it is also possible that the decision to adopt social 
distancing is much more related to demographic characteristics or political affiliation due to 
the enormous politicization of the issue.  
Second, and based on the longitudinal data collected between the follow-up surveys 
and the baseline data, it seems that demographic factors are also some of the factors that can 
explain changes among individuals who reported changes in their behaviors. Based on our 
analyses, females, currently married people, and people living in densely populated areas are 
especially prone to change their social distancing behaviors. Knowledge of what demographic 
groups are more prone to making changes to their social distancing and mask-wearing can be 
enormously beneficial from a policy targeting perceptive. 
Finally, we document the importance of two factors that are especially prone to 
information barriers, and that can also influence social distancing behaviors: risk 
misperception and exponential growth bias. Highlighting the role these factors play on 
influencing behaviors underscores the potential use for policies geared towards correcting 
these perception biases. 
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 Policies that target demographic groups known to understate the risks associated with 
COVID-19 or misinterpreting the speed at which it spreads can be effective.38 The findings 
from this study are informative for crafting such policies. Notwithstanding some limitations, 
the present study offers additional direct evidence on what demographic groups could be 
particularly suitable for such interventions.  
 
  
 
 
   
    
 
38 Lammers et al. (2020) discuss the effectiveness of such policies. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample  Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Socioeconomic Characteristics:       
Age  42.40 (19.14) 44.88 (18.83) 32.99 (17.36) 
Years of Schooling 15.35 (2.42) 15.53 (2.37) 14.68 (2.46) 
Four-Year College Graduate (=1 if yes) 0.61 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) 0.46 (0.50) 
Current Full-time Student (=1 if yes) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.33) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) 0.80 (0.40) 0.82 (0.38) 0.70 (0.46) 
African American (=1 if yes) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.16) 
Female (=1 if yes) 0.79 (0.41) - - 
Currently Married (=1 if yes)  0.41 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31) 0.13 (0.33) 
Democrat (=1 if yes) 0.60 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 
Currently Employed (=1 if yes) 0.48 (0.50)          0.50 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 
Household Annual Income (in USD) 115924.00 
(75520.69) 
115701.30 
(74505.39) 
116768.60 
(79453.96) 
Health Statusa         4.04 (0.78) 4.02 (0.79) 4.11 (0.75) 
Ever smoked before outbreak (=1 if yes)  0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43) 
Current smoker (=1 if yes)  0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.19) 
Alcohol frequency (before outbreak) b 1.61 (1.80) 1.59 (1.80) 1.67 (1.79) 
Alcohol currently b 1.75 (2.13) 1.78 (2.16) 1.68 (2.04) 
Concern about own health c  4.29 (2.65) 4.39 (2.68) 3.89 (2.52) 
    
COVID-19-related Characteristics:    
Likelihood contracting COVID-19 (percent) 0.34 (0.26) 0.35 (0.26) 0.30 (0.27) 
Chance of severe symptoms after COVID-19 infection (percent)  0.48 (0.30) 0.51 (0.30) 0.39 (0.30) 
Subjective Assessment Case Fatality Rate of COVID-19 (percent) 0.08 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 0.08 (0.13) 
Subjective Assessment Case Fatality Rate of COVID-19 in own 
demographic category (percent) 
0.05 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11) 0.04 (0.09) 
County of Residence Case Fatality Rate (percent) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03) 
    
Other Characteristics:    
Cognitive Score d 0.94 (0.48) 0.90 (0.45) 1.09 (0.54) 
Time Preferences Indexe 20.61 (10.43) 20.63 (10.26) 20.56 (11.06) 
Risk-Preference Indexf 5.10 (2.97) 5.01 (3.04) 5.47 (2.69) 
Patient (=1 if yes)   0.23 (0.42)  0.21 (0.41)  0.27 (0.45) 
Impatient (=1 if yes)  0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.33) 
Time-Inconsistent (=1 if yes) g 0.25 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.45) 
    
Observations 901 713 188 
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Behavior outcomes based on baseline wave of survey. (a) Health Status: 1 being “very poor” and 5 
being “excellent”  (b) Alcohol consumption is the number of days per week in which the respondent reported having a drink (c) Worry about own health: 
0=not at all, 10=a lot. (d) Cognitive score is derived based on total possible correct answers (=4) on a Raven’s Matrices test divided by the time allotted to 
task (two minutes). (e) Time preference index from 1 (extremely impatient) to 32 (extremely patient) based on a near-frame question. Impatient (=1 if time 
preference index is 1). Patient (=1 if time preference index is 32). (f) Risk preference index from 0 (extremely risk tolerant) to 10 (extremely risk averse). (g) 
“Time-inconsistent” is defined with respect to two “money” questions: 1) a near-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD today and 
a larger amount of USD in 12 months. 2) a distant-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD in 12 months and a larger amount of 
USD in 24 months. Individuals were identified as “hyperbolic” time-inconsistent if they preferred the immediate reward in the near-term frame combined 
with the choice of the delayed reward in the distant frame. 
 
    
2 
Table 2. Summary by Study States 
 
 
  CT FL         MA          MD               NJ          NY         PA 
          (1)            (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)           (6)          (7) 
Socioeconomic Characteristics:           
Age  50.83 (16.06) 60.29 (11.41) 52.51 (15.76) 52.17 (14.61) 47.04 (16.16) 28.29 (14.13) 53.70 (13.67) 
Years of Schooling 16.31 (2.47) 16.14 (2.05) 16.51 (2.21) 16.47 (1.74) 16.15 (2.46) 14.05 (2.04) 16.57 (2.17) 
Four-Year College Graduate (=1 if yes) 0.77 (0.42) 0.79 (0.41)  0.82 (0.39) 0.86 (0.35) 0.75 (0.44) 0.36 (0.48) 0.82 (0.38) 
Current Full-time Student (=1 if yes) 0.08 (0.28) - - 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) 0.17 (0.38) 0.02 (0.14) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) 0.92 (0.28) 0.95 (0.21) 0.94 (0.24) 0.91 (0.28) 0.84 (0.37) 0.62 (0.49) 0.97 (0.16) 
African American (=1 if yes) 0.02 (0.14) - 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.19) - 
Female (=1 if yes) 0.83 (0.38) 0.85 (0.36) 0.90 (0.31) 0.90 (0.31) 0.88 (0.33) 0.70 (0.46) 0.84 (0.36) 
Currently Married (=1 if yes)  0.46 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.55 (0.50) 0.66 (0.48) 0.59 (0.50) 0.13 (0.34) 0.67 (0.47) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.10 (0.31) 0.18 (0.39) - 0.16 (0.37) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29) 0.18 (0.39) 
Democrat (=1 if yes) 0.69 (0.47) 0.54 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47) 0.68 (0.47) 0.56 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 
Currently Employed (=1 if yes) 0.54 (0.50)     0.48 (0.50)   0.64 (0.48) 0.71 (0.46) 0.58 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.61 (0.49) 
Household Annual Income (in USD) 135572.90 
(69975.75) 
114023.80 
(72582.43) 
125074.60 
(72156.93) 
144137.90 
(68831.97) 
151062.50 
(67088.85) 
99658.23 
(77372.85) 
120118.20 
(71450.20) 
Health Statusa  4.00 (0.88) 4.01 (0.70) 3.97 (0.90) 4.12 (0.75) 3.98 (0.76) 4.09 (0.74) 3.99 (0.86) 
Ever smoked before outbreak (=1 if yes)  0.15 (0.36) 0.38 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47) 0.22 (0.42) 0.25 (0.44) 0.24 (0.43) 0.31 (0.46) 
Current smoker (=1 if yes)  - 0.10 (0.31) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.21) 
Alcohol frequency (before outbreak) b 1.63 (1.92) 2.10 (2.31) 1.93 (2.12) 1.55 (1.63) 1.56 (1.73) 1.43 (1.51) 1.65 (1.96)  
Alcohol currently b 1.92 (2.24) 2.39 (2.49) 2.15 (2.35) 2.29 (2.24) 1.89 (2.01) 1.27 (1.79) 2.08 (2.34) 
Concern about own health c  4.79 (2.58)  4.87 (2.77) 4.58 (3.07) 4.28 (2.66) 4.76 (2.61) 3.88 (2.45) 4.43 (2.77) 
        
Respondents Beliefs Regarding COVID-19: 
   
    
Likelihood contracting COVID-19 (percent) 0.34 (0.23) 0.31 (0.24) 0.37 (0.32) 0.36 (0.26) 0.33 (0.26) 0.34 (0.27) 0.32 (0.25) 
Chance of severe symptoms after COVID-19 infection (percent) 0.54 (0.25) 0.60 (0.31) 0.55 (0.33) 0.47 (0.24) 0.52 (0.31) 0.42 (0.29) 0.52 (0.30) 
Subjective Assessment Case Fatality Rate of COVID-19 (percent) 0.05 (0.07) 0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.10) 0.04 (0.08) 0.07 (0.13) 0.11 (0.15) 0.04 (0.07) 
Subjective Assessment Case Fatality Rate of COVID-19 in own 
demographic category (percent) 
0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.10) 0.07 (0.14) 0.05 (0.14) 0.05 (0.10) 0.05 (0.10) 0.06 (0.12) 
        
Other Characteristics:        
Cognitive Score d 0.81 (0.48) 0.88 (0.44) 0.94 (0.47) 0.87 (0.46) 0.92 (0.42) 1.01 (0.51) 0.86 (0.41) 
Time Preferences Indexe 22.66 (9.87) 20.53 (10.13) 22.75 (9.09) 22.59 (11.04) 21.49 (10.07) 19.09 (10.85) 21.86 (9.70) 
Risk-Preference Indexf 4.38 (3.27) 5.06 (2.90) 4.94 (2.90) 5.42 (2.67) 4.80 (3.29) 5.20 (2.95) 5.24 (3.00) 
Patient (=1 if yes)  0.31 (0.47) 0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49) 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.40) 0.26 (0.44) 
Impatient (=1 if yes)  0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.06 (0.24) 0.10 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.34) 0.08 (0.27) 
Time-Inconsistent (=1 if yes) g 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35) 0.28 (0.45) 0.19 (0.40) 0.30 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 
        
Observations  48 105 67 58 80 395 148 
Notes:  Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Behavior outcomes based on baseline wave of survey. (a) Health Status: 1 being “very poor” and 5 being “excellent”  (b) Alcohol consumption is the number of 
days per week in which the respondent reported having a drink (c) Worry about own health: 0=not at all, 10=a lot. (d) Cognitive score is derived based on total possible correct answers (=4) on a Raven’s Matrices test 
divided by the time allotted to task (two minutes). (e) Time preference index from 1 (extremely impatient) to 32 (extremely patient) based on a near-frame question. Impatient (=1 if time preference index is 1). Patient 
(=1 if time preference index is 32). (f) Risk preference index from 0 (extremely risk tolerant) to 10 (extremely risk averse). (g) “Time-inconsistent” is defined with respect to two “money” questions: 1) a near-frame 
question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD today and a larger amount of USD in 12 months. 2) a distant-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD in 12 months and a larger 
amount of USD in 24 months. Individuals were identified as “hyperbolic” time-inconsistent if they preferred the immediate reward in the near-term frame combined with the choice of the delayed reward in the distant 
frame. 
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Table 3. Summary Social Distancing by Demographic Characteristics 
 Social Distancing Behavior (Baseline)  Social Distancing Behavior (Change)a 
 Did not 
Maintain Six 
Feet (=1 if yes) 
Did not Stay 
Home (=1 if 
yes) 
Non-
essential 
Outings (#) 
Days Out 
Past Week 
(#) 
Social 
Distancing 
Indexb 
 
Did not 
Maintain 
Six Feet 
Did not 
Stay 
Home 
Days Out 
Past Week 
(#) 
Social 
Distancing 
Indexb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (9) (10) 
           
All  0.47 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.74 (1.03) 3.03 (2.10) 0.00 (1.33)  0.17 (0.55) 0.16 (0.51) 0.49 (1.70) 8.09e-09 (1.89) 
High School Diploma (=1 if yes) 0.51 (0.50) 0.69 (0.47) 1.08 (1.20) 2.64 (1.85) 0.01 (1.32)  0.13 (0.54) 0.11 (0.55) 0.35 (1.83) -0.14 (1.34) 
Some College (=1 if yes) 0.52 (0.50) 0.74 (0.44) 0.98 (1.16) 2.88 (2.07) 0.13 (1.33)  0.12 (0.52) 0.12 (0.49) 0.47 (1.65) -0.09 (1.17) 
College Degree (=1 if yes) 0.44 (0.50) 0.68 (0.46) 0.56 (0.88) 3.19 (2.15) -0.06 (1.34)  0.19 (0.56) 0.19 (0.50) 0.53 (1.69) 0.07 (1.15) 
Graduate School (=1 if yes) 0.40 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49) 0.51 (0.84) 3.04 (2.23) -0.23 (1.43)  0.20 (0.53) 0.17 (0.50) 0.65 (1.85) 0.10 (1.19) 
Democrat (=1 if yes) 0.43 (0.49) 0.69 (0.46) 0.66 (0.95) 3.03 (2.11) -0.07 (1.28)  0.17 (0.55) 0.15 (0.49) 0.46 (1.67) -0.03 (1.13) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.53 (0.50) 0.81 (0.39) 0.90 (1.19) 3.21 (2.06) 0.25 (0.43)  0.24 (0.47) 0.17 (0.48) 0.67 (1.94) 0.14 (1.19) 
Independent or Other (=1 if yes) 0.52 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.85 (1.11) 2.97 (2.11) 0.04 (1.40)  0.13 (0.57) 0.19 (0.55) 0.49 (1.68) 0.01 (1.29) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) 0.48 (0.50) 0.73 (0.44) 0.69 (0.99) 3.22 (2.09) 0.07 (1.31)  0.17 (0.55) 0.16 (0.49) 0.53 (1.66) 0.02 (1.16) 
African American (=1 if yes) 0.53 (0.51) 0.74 (0.45) 1.16 (1.30) 0.21 (0.42) 0.08 (1.69)  0.25 (0.62) 0.00 (0.00) 0.17 (1.70) -0.24 (0.85) 
Hispanic (=1 if yes) 0.43 (0.50) 0.64 (0.49) 1.11 (1.20) 2.93 (2.32) -0.04 (1.49)  0.19 (0.40) 0.19 (0.56) 0.07 (1.99) -0.09 (1.38) 
Other Ethnicity (=1 if yes) 0.44 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.83 (1.11) 2.14 (1.82) -0.42 (1.25)  0.12 (0.61) 0.18 (0.59) 0.43 (1.84) -0.03 (1.34) 
           
Observations 901 901 901 901 901  623 623 623 623 
Notes:  Education levels: Graduate school includes the following degrees: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, and Doctorate Degrees (ex: PhD, EdD). (a) Represents the change in behavior from the baseline to the week 
two follow-up survey. (b) The social distancing index is based on a PCA procedure based on the four distinct proxies (did not maintain six feet in previous week; did not stay home in previous week; number of 
non-essential outings; days out of home in previous week) of social distancing.  
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Table 4. Summary Mask Wearing by Demographic Characteristics 
 
Wears a Mask (=1 if yes) 
Wears a Mask when 
Shopping (=1 if yes) 
 
Wears a Mask 
(Change) a 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
All 0.68 (0.47) 0.91 (0.28)  -0.01 (0.49) 
High School Diploma (=1 if yes) 0.64 (0.48) 0.86 (0.35)  0.00 (0.47) 
Some College (=1 if yes) 0.67 (0.47) 0.89 (0.31)  -0.05 (0.53) 
College Degree (=1 if yes) 0.70 (0.46) 0.93 (0.25)  0.00 (0.47) 
Graduate School (=1 if yes) 0.61 (0.49) 0.88 (0.33)  -0.06 (0.53) 
Democrat (=1 if yes) 0.71 (0.46) 0.91 (0.28)  -0.02 (0.50) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.63 (0.49) 0.87 (0.34)  0.02 (0.54) 
Independent or Other (=1 if yes) 0.65 (0.48) 0.93 (0.26)  0.01 (0.46) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) 0.67 (0.47) 0.92 (0.27)  0.01 (0.48) 
African American (=1 if yes) 0.63 (0.50) 0.84 (0.37)  0.17 (0.58) 
Hispanic (=1 if yes) 0.73 (0.45) 0.93 (0.25)  -0.15 (0.53) 
Other Ethnicity (=1 if yes) 0.71 (0.45) 0.88 (0.32)  -0.06 (0.53) 
     
Observations 901 901  623 
Notes:  Graduate school includes the following degrees: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, and Doctorate Degrees (ex: PhD, EdD). (a) Represents the change in 
behavior from the baseline to the week two follow-up survey. 
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Table 5. Summary Opinion of Government Response by Political Affiliation 
 Federal Government 
Reaction 
State Government 
Reaction 
Local Government 
Reaction 
General Public 
Reaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All 4.24 (0.94) 3.22 (0.78) 3.29 (0.75) 3.77 (1.00) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 3.15 (1.02) 2.74 (1.08) 2.86 (0.91) 3.14 (1.21) 
Democrat (=1 if yes) 4.54 (0.68) 3.35 (0.66) 3.40 (0.64) 3.95 (0.88) 
Independent and Other (=1 if yes) 4.04 (0.99) 3.15 (0.78) 3.24 (0.83) 3.64 (1.04) 
     
Observations 892 898 849 885 
Notes:  The attitude questions were scale-based, using scale the following scale: 1=reaction is much too extreme to 5=reaction is not at all sufficient. The 
questions are: reaction to federal government’s response (“Do you think the reaction of the federal government to the current coronavirus outbreak is appropriate, 
too extreme, or not sufficient?”), reaction to state government’s response (“Do you think the reaction of your state government to the current coronavirus outbreak 
is appropriate, too extreme, or not sufficient?”), reaction to local government’s response (“Do you think the reaction of your local government to the current 
coronavirus outbreak is appropriate, too extreme, or not sufficient?”), reaction to the general public’s response (“Do you think the reaction of most people in the 
United States is appropriate, too extreme, or not sufficient?”). 
6 
Table 6. Determinants of Proxy Measures of Social Distancing 
 Did not Stay 
Home (=1 if yes) 
Non-essential 
Outings (#) 
Days out past 
week (#) 
Did not Maintain 
Six Feet (=1 if yes) 
Social Distancing 
Indexa 
Wears a Mask 
(=1 if yes) 
Wears a Mask when 
Shopping (=1 if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.00**   
(0.00) 
0.01   
(0.01) 
-0.00*   
(0.00) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00***   
(0.00) 
0.00*   
(0.00) 
Female (=1 if yes) 0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.09  
(0.11) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Currently Married (=1 if 
yes) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.18**  
(0.08) 
-0.23  
(0.18) 
-0.07  
(0.04) 
-0.20*  
(0.11) 
0.04  
(0.04) 
0.05**  
(0.02) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) 0.13***  
(0.04) 
0.06  
(0.10) 
0.41**  
(0.21) 
0.09*  
(0.05) 
0.38***  
(0.13) 
-0.12***  
(0.04) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
Schooling -0.02*  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.06) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.04  
(0.04) 
-0.02*  
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
College Graduate (=1 if 
yes) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.02  
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.10**  
(0.05) 
0.26**  
(0.11) 
0.04  
(0.23) 
0.05  
(0.05) 
0.28** 
(0.14) 
-0.05  
(0.04) 
-0.05  
(0.03) 
Earnings (Logged) 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Population Density 
(Logged) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.07**  
(0.04) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
Concerned About 
Healthb 
-0.01**  
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06**  
(0.03) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
-0.03**  
(0.02) 
0.01*  
(0.01) 
0.01*  
(0.00) 
COVID19 Infection 
Fears on a Daily Basisc 
-0.04  
(0.04) 
-0.04  
(0.09) 
0.37**  
(0.18) 
-0.04  
(0.04) 
-0.00  
(0.11) 
0.05  
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
Number Comorbidities 0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.12*  
(0.07) 
-0.36**  
(0.15) 
-0.00  
(0.03) 
-0.11  
(0.09) 
0.04  
(0.03) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
Cognitive Scored 0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.04) 
-0.05  
(0.07) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
0.02  
(0.01) 
Risk Aversion Indexe -0.02***  
(0.01) 
-0.02  
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
-0.05***  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
Time Preference Indexf 0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00*  
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.00) 
-0.00**  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
Time Inconsistent (=1 if 
yes)g 
0.04  
(0.04) 
0.06  
(0.08) 
0.04  
(0.18) 
-0.00  
(0.04) 
0.09  
(0.11) 
-0.04  
(0.04) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
Positive Reciprocity 
Index 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.04*  
(0.02) 
-0.07  
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.05*  
(0.03) 
0.02**  
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
Altruism Index -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 6 (Continued): Determinants of Social Distancing 
 Did not Stay 
Home (=1 if yes) 
Non-essential 
Outings (#) 
Days Out Past 
Week (#) 
Did not Maintain 
Six Feet (=1 if yes) 
Social Distancing 
Index 
Wears a Mask 
(=1 if yes) 
Wears a Mask when 
Shopping (=1 if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Exponential Growth Bias 
Indexh  
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.11**  
(0.04) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.05*  
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01*  
(0.01) 
Risk Misperception (in 
percent)i 
0.13  
(0.13) 
0.39  
(0.28) 
-0.13  
(0.60) 
0.07  
(0.14) 
0.33  
(0.38) 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
-0.03  
(0.08) 
Openness Indexj 0.03  
(0.02) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
0.09*  
(0.05) 
0.03*  
(0.02) 
0.02*  
(0.01) 
Extraversion Indexj -0.00  
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.07) 
-0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
Conscientiousness Indexj -0.01  
(0.02) 
0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.03  
(0.07) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.04  
(0.05) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
Agreeableness Indexj -0.03  
(0.02) 
-0.08**  
(0.04) 
-0.11  
(0.07) 
-0.04**  
(0.02) 
-0.13***  
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
Neuroticism Indexj -0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.04  
(0.08) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.05  
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
        
Baseline Mean                                     0.70 0.74 3.03 0.47 0.00 0.70 0.91 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.02 
        
Observations 901 901 901 901 901 901 901 
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All models include state and regional fixed effects. Behavior outcomes based on baseline wave of survey. (a) The social 
distancing index is based on a PCA procedure based on the four distinct proxies (did not maintain six feet in previous week; did not stay home in previous week; number of non-essential 
outings; days out of home in previous week) of social distancing. (b) Worry about own health: 0=not at all, 10=a lot. (c) COVID-19 Fear is constructed as a binary measure based on the 
respondent indicating that he/she worries on daily to the following question “How frequently have you feared being infected with COVID-19 in the past month?” (d) Cognitive score is 
derived based on total possible correct answers (=4) divided by time allocation for task (two minutes). (e) Risk preference index from 0 (extremely risk tolerant) to 10 (extremely risk 
averse). (f) Time preference index from 1 (extremely impatient) to 32 (extremely patient) based on a near-frame question. Impatient (=1 if time preference index is 1). Patient (=1 if time 
preference index is 32). (g) “Time-inconsistent” is defined with respect to two “money” questions: 1) a near-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD today and a 
larger amount of USD in 12 months. 2) a distant-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD in 12 months and a larger amount of USD in 24 months. Individuals 
were identified as “hyperbolic” time-inconsistent if they preferred the immediate reward in the near-term frame combined with the choice of the delayed reward in the distance frame. (h) 
The exponential growth bias index is based on the number of incorrect responses on five exponential growth-related questions. Higher values on the index indicate higher exponential 
growth bias. (i) Risk misperception is the difference between the subjectively elicited case fatality rate in own county minus the actual case fatality rate at the time of the interview based on 
data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (j) The five variables (openness, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism) are based on a taxonomy from 
psychology theory for the “Big Five” personality traits. They are indices (higher values on the index indicate increased tendency of the particular trait).  
***Significant at the 1 percent level.  
**Significant at the 5 percent level.  
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 7: Personal Characteristics and Change in Social Distancing Measures 
 Did not Stay 
Home (=1 if yes) 
Days out past 
week (#) 
Did not Maintain 
Six Feet (=1 if yes) 
Social Distancing 
Indexa 
Wears a Mask 
(=1 if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Female (=1 if yes) -0.02 
(0.05) 
0.17 
(0.18) 
0.04  
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Currently Married (=1 
if yes) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.40** 
(0.18) 
0.06  
(0.06) 
0.28** 
(0.13) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) -0.01 
(0.06) 
0.41** 
(0.21) 
0.01  
(0.07) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Schooling -0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
College Graduate (=1 if 
yes) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.32 
(0.28) 
0.07  
(0.09) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Republican (=1 if yes) 0.01 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.10  
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Earnings (Logged) -0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Population Density 
(Logged) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Concerned About 
Healthb 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
COVID19 Infection 
Fears on a Daily Basisc 
0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.26 
(0.19) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
Number Comorbidities -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Cognitive Scored 0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
Risk Aversion Indexe 0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Time Preference Indexf -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Time Inconsistent (=1 if 
yes)g 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
Positive Reciprocity 
Index 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Altruism Index -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 7 (Continued): Personal Characteristics and Change in Social Distancing Measures 
 Did not Stay 
Home (=1 if yes) 
Days Out Past 
Week (#) 
Did not Maintain 
Six Feet (=1 if yes) 
Social Distancing 
Index 
Wears a Mask 
(=1 if yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exponential Growth Bias 
Indexh  
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.45) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Risk Misperception (in 
percent)i 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
0.50 
(0.60) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
Openness Indexj -0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
Extraversion Indexj -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Conscientiousness Indexj -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Agreeableness Indexj -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.21*** 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Neuroticism Indexj 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.6) (0.02) 
Baseline Mean                                     0.70 3.03 0.47 0.00 0.70 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
      
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 
Notes: Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All models include state and regional fixed effects. Behavior outcomes based on 
baseline wave of survey. (a) The social distancing index is based on a PCA procedure based on the four distinct proxies (did not maintain six 
feet in previous week; did not stay home in previous week; days out of home in previous week) of social distancing. (b) Worry about own 
health: 0=not at all, 10=a lot. (c) COVID-19 Fear is constructed as a binary measure based on the respondent indicating that he/she worries on 
daily to the following question “How frequently have you feared being infected with COVID-19 in the past month?” (d) Cognitive score is 
derived based on total possible correct answers (=4) divided by time allocation for task (two minutes). (e) Risk preference index from 0 
(extremely risk tolerant) to 10 (extremely risk averse). (f) Time preference index from 1 (extremely impatient) to 32 (extremely patient) based 
on a near-frame question. Impatient (=1 if time preference index is 1). Patient (=1 if time preference index is 32). (g) “Time-inconsistent” is 
defined with respect to two “money” questions: 1) a near-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD today and a larger 
amount of USD in 12 months. 2) a distant-frame question prompting individuals to choose between 160 USD in 12 months and a larger amount 
of USD in 24 months. Individuals were identified as “hyperbolic” time-inconsistent if they preferred the immediate reward in the near-term 
frame combined with the choice of the delayed reward in the distance frame. (h) The exponential growth bias index is based on the number of 
incorrect responses on five exponential growth-related questions. Higher values on the index indicate higher exponential growth bias. (i) Risk 
misperception is the difference between the subjectively elicited case fatality rate in own county minus the actual case fatality rate at the time of 
the interview based on data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (j) The five variables (openness, extraversion, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism) are based on a taxonomy from psychology theory for the “Big Five” personality traits. They are 
indices (higher values on the index indicate increased tendency of the particular trait).  
***Significant at the 1 percent level.  
**Significant at the 5 percent level.  
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 8. Determinants of Risk Perception of Case Fatality Rate in County of Residence 
 Subjective Risk 
Perception 
(Percent) 
 
Risk Misperception, 
Subjective-Objective 
(Percent) 
 (1)  (2) 
Age -0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
Female (=1 if yes) 0.02*  
(0.01) 
 0.02* 
(0.01)  
Currently Married (=1 if yes) -0.01  
(0.01) 
 -0.01  
(0.01) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) -0.06***  
(0.01) 
 -0.06***  
(0.01) 
Schooling -0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
College Graduate (=1 if yes) -0.00  
(0.01) 
 -0.00  
(0.02) 
Republican (=1 if yes) -0.02** 
(0.01) 
 -0.03**  
(0.01) 
Earnings (Logged) -0.01**  
(0.00) 
 -0.01  
(0.00) 
Population Density (Logged) 0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00*  
(0.00) 
Concerned About Health 0.00***  
(0.00) 
 0.00**  
(0.00) 
COVID19 Infection Fears on a Daily 
Basis 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
 -0.00  
(0.01) 
Number Comorbidities -0.01  
(0.01) 
 -0.00  
(0.01) 
News Source Fox/MSNBC (=1 if yes) 0.00  
(0.01) 
 0.00  
(0.01) 
COVID-19 Cases in Social Circle -0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
Cognitive Score   0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
Risk Aversion Index 0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
Time Preference Index -0.00* 
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
Time-inconsistent (=1 if yes) -0.01  
(0.01) 
 -0.01  
(0.01) 
Positive Reciprocity -0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
Altruism 0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
Exponential Growth Bias Index 0.01***  
(0.00) 
 0.01***  
(0.00) 
Openness Index 0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
Extraversion Index 0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
Conscientiousness Index 0.01*  
(0.00) 
 0.01  
(0.00) 
Agreeableness Index -0.00  
(0.00) 
 -0.00  
(0.00) 
Neuroticism Index 0.00  
(0.00) 
 0.00  
(0.00) 
    
Baseline Mean                                      0.08  0.01 
Controls Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.15  0.13 
    
Observations 901  901 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All models include state and regional fixed effects. Full 
details on variable definitions are in the notes to Table VI. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 9. Determinants of Exponential Growth Bias Index 
 Exponential Growth Bias Index  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age 0.02***  
(0.00) 
0.02***  
(0.00) 
0.02***  
(0.00) 
Female (=1 if yes) 0.50***  
(0.13) 
0.43***  
(0.14) 
0.32**  
(0.14) 
Currently Married (=1 if yes) -0.14  
(0.14) 
-0.10  
(0.14) 
-0.09  
(0.14) 
Caucasian (=1 if yes) -0.03  
(0.10) 
-0.01  
(0.16) 
-0.03  
(0.16) 
Schooling -0.07**  
(0.03) 
-0.07**  
(0.03) 
-0.06**  
(0.03) 
Earnings (Logged) -0.18***  
(0.06) 
-0.15***  
(0.06) 
-0.13***  
(0.06) 
Population Density (Logged) -0.03  
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
Concerned About Health -0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
COVID19 Infection Fears on a 
Daily Basis 
0.17  
(0.14) 
0.11  
(0.14) 
0.06  
(0.14) 
Number Comorbidities 0.08  
(0.12) 
0.09  
(0.11) 
0.10  
(0.11) 
Cognitive Score  -0.16***  
(0.06) 
-0.16***  
(0.06) 
Risk Aversion Index  -0.05**  
(0.02) 
-0.06**  
(0.02) 
Time Preference Index   -0.02***  
(0.01) 
-0.02***  
(0.01) 
Time-inconsistent (=1 if yes)  -0.16  
(0.13) 
-0.14  
(0.14) 
Positive Reciprocity  -0.04  
(0.03) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
Altruism  0.05  
(0.03) 
0.04  
(0.03) 
Risk Misperception (in percent)   1.33***  
(0.45) 
Openness Index   0.04  
(0.06) 
Extraversion Index   0.06  
(0.06) 
Conscientiousness Index   0.07  
(0.05) 
Agreeableness Index   0.08  
(0.06) 
Neuroticism Index   0.17***  
(0.06) 
    
Baseline Mean                                     3.13e-08 3.13e-08 3.13e-08 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 
    
Observations 901 901 901 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All models include state and regional fixed 
effects. Full details on variable definitions are in the notes to Table VI. ***Significant at the 
1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
